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Governmentally Created Erosion on the




A landowner with frontage along the Atlantic, Pacific or Gulf
Coasts of the United States faces a variety of natural hazards which
affect the integrity of his property. Storms, including hurricanes,
constantly threaten the land's physical existence and the improve-
ments thereon. Buildings disrupt the beach's equilibrium, as do bath-
ers and fishermen who walk in the dunes. Natural erosion also
presents a gradual and, often, more permanent threat than the occa-
sional storm. To counter these forces, federal, state and local govern-
ments give aid, in a variety of forms, to a landowner to prevent the
loss of the valuable resources. For example, the Coastal Zone Man-
agement Act,1 the Federal Flood Insurance,2 the Coastal Barrier Re-
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1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1982). This Act is designed to create a joint federal-state
effort to protect the coastal zone. The Act is based upon a finding that the coastal zones,
including beaches, serve as a vital natural resource. To receive funds under the Act, each
coastal state must prepare a coastal management program which includes, "A definition of the
term 'beach' and a planning process for the protection of, and access to, public beaches and
other public coastal areas of environmental, recreational, historical, esthetic, ecological, or cul-
tural value." Id. § 1454(b)(7).
The program must also include "A planning process for (a) assessing the effects of shore-
line erosion (however caused), and (b) studying and evaluating ways to control, or lessen the
impact of, such erosion, and to restore areas adversely affected by such erosion." Id. §
1454(b)(9).
According to the implementing regulations, the shoreline erosion/mitigation plan must
include "an identification and description of enforceable policies, legal authorities, funding
techniques and techniques that will be used to manage the effects of erosion as the State's
planning process indicates is necessary." 15 C.F.R. § 923.25(c)(1) (1984).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4128 (1982). The National Flood Insurance Act is designed to
protect homeowners and businesses from losses caused by floods. Although environmentalists
claim that the program subsidizes siting of homes and businesses in delicate, environmentally
sensitive areas, the program requires communities to design programs which minimize the dan-
ger of flood loss. Id. § 4102. The basic plan is designed to:
(1) constrict the development of land which is exposed to flood damage where
appropriate,
sources Act' and numerous state and local acts are designed to pre-
serve both privately and publicly owned beaches.
Unfortunately, one type of governmental activity has the poten-
tial for permanent destruction of the integrity and value of the very
property that has been declared a vital national natural resource.
Governmentally created erosion resulting from navigational projects
can take property from private landowners. Such projects have actu-
ally effected takings of property without governmental compensation
to the landowner for his loss.
This situation has arisen because courts have failed to under-
stand the physical processes at work on the coast, and have histori-
cally given preemptive force to the Interstate Commerce Power," as
embodied by the navigational servitude5 , over the takings clause of
the fifth amendment.6 In addition to this Interstate Commerce prior-
(2) guide the development of proposed construction away from locations which
are threatened by flood hazards,
(3) assist in reducing damage caused by floods, and
(4) otherwise improve the long-range land management and use of flood prone
areas.
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3510 (1982). The Act, passed in 1982, is designed to reduce
federal expenditures on development of coastal barrier islands. In its Findings and Purpose
Section, Congress found that "coastal barriers serve as natural storm protective buffers and
are generally unsuitable for development." Id. § 3501(a)(3). In addition, the Congress found:
coastal barriers along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts of the United States and the
adjacent wetlands, marshes, estuaries, inlets and near shore waters provide-
(A) habitats for migratory birds and other wildlife; and
(B) habitat which are essential spawning nursery, and feeding areas for commer-
cially and recreationally important species of finfish and shellfish, as well as
other aquatic organisms such as sea turtles.
Id. § 3501(A)(1).
4. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The entire Commerce Clause is deceptively simple,
stating that the Congress has the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes."
5. The navigational servitude is essentially a dominant property right, derived from
the Commerce Clause, which permits the federal government to carry out regulatory improve-
ments to the nation's navigable waters. As will be shown, the servitude is not coextensive with
the power to regulate.
The definition of navigable waters appears to change depending upon whether the Court is
dealing with admiralty jurisdiction, regulation of navigable waters under the Commerce
Clause, or public ownership of submerged lands. See T. SCHOENBAUM & A. YIANNOPOULOS,
ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAw 80-83 (1984) (for an excellent discussion of the three con-
cepts). The authors suggest that for regulation of commerce, the traditional test set down in
The Daniel Ball is the test most often applied by the Courts and Congress in legislation. This
test states:
And they constitute navigable waters of the United States within the meaning of
the Acts of Congress, in contradistinction from the navigable waters of the
States, when they form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting
with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may be car-
ried on which other States or foreign countries in the customary modes in which
such commerce is conducted by water.
[77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557,563 (1870).]
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Takings Clause states: "No person shall...be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation."
The "takings clause" has never been formally applied to the states through the 14th
amendment. However, the Court has interpreted the 14th amendment's due process clause as
ity, the courts, in an effort to determine whether there has been a
taking, have employed a test in artificial erosion cases which is ap-
propriate only in freshwater diversion or impoundment cases. This
article intends to demonstrate why courts have been incorrect in dis-
allowing compensation in cases in which the government has caused
erosion along the nation's coasts and proposes a more appropriate
test to be utilized in such cases.
II. Background
The United States Supreme Court has consistently used a
"physical invasion" test in freshwater erosion cases to determine
whether there has been a compensable taking caused by government
navigation projects. Such a test, when applied to coastal erosion,
places the landowner in an impossible position because the flooding
required to trigger the test's application is imperceptible. Although
flooding actually occurs, it occurs very slowly. Because the physical
invasion test has been mechanically applied to the coastal erosion
cases with little critical analysis, many deserving landowners have
been denied compensation. A re-examination of what actually occurs
in such cases will demonstrate how courts have unfairly denied com-
pensation for governmentally created erosion along the seashore.
The Supreme Court has recently re-examined the compensation
issue in cases in which governmental bodies misuse their regulatory
powers. During the last five years, the Supreme Court has become
more sensitive to regulatory takings7 and has begun to restrict regu-
latory activities under the rubric of "navigational servitude" when
the government is unwilling to pay compensation for the losses suf-
fered by a landowner. 8 The proper application of the physical inva-
sion test in saltwater erosion cases, coupled with a new sensitivity to
regulatory takings, should enable the courts to provide appropriate
relief for governmentally created erosion along the seashore.
A. The Navigational Servitude
The navigational servitude appears to be a a logical extension of
the interstate commerce power.' In United States v. Rands,10 the
prohibiting states from taking property without due process, and preventing states from taking
property without just compensation, Chicago, B. & 0. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897),
and for a private purpose Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896).
7. The Court has decided two important traditional land use cases recently. Both seem
to indicate that the Court is beginning to analyze regulatory taking cases from the viewpoint
of the "burden to the landowner." See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104 (1978); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
8. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
9. Because the Commerce Clause gives the federal government paramount control
over regulation of interstate commerce and because the Court has stated that there is public
property right in navigable waters, the navigable servitude was born. See Gilman v. Philadel-
phia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865).
10. 389 U.S. 121 (1967).
United States Supreme Court articulated the dimensions of the
power and its impact on riparian" land owners. The Court noted
that the commerce clause "confers a unique position upon the Gov-
ernment in connection with navigable waters." 2 In the Court's view,
the commerce clause gives the United States a property right in the
navigable waters of the United States,1 s which right is called a "nav-
igation servitude". 14 A proper exercise by the government of its
power causes no invasion of private property rights in the water, and,
thus, the government incurs no obligation to compensate a land-
owner. 15 Courts have held that the navigational servitude power is
properly exercised even when the government causes the course of a
stream or river to be changed, 6 leaving a former riparian owner
with no water, or when physical obstructions created by the govern-
ment cause a riparian landowner's access to water to be cut off. 7
The Court in Rands recognized a major, and logical, restriction
on the power to regulate the nation's navigable water.18 Because the
navigational servitude does not extend above the high water mark,
governmental activity which takes "fast lands"" requires compensa-
tion under the fifth amendment.20
The Rands case itself did not enunciate a new doctrine. The
Court, for over one-hundred years, has acknowledged the power of
the government to improve navigation. In Gilman v. Philadelphia,21
for example, the Court recognized that the navigational servitude
could be used to block state projects that unduly interfere with inter-
state commerce.2 2 Gilman concerned a plan by the Pennsylvania leg-
11. The term "riparian" refers to the banks of a river or small pond. It is incorrect to
refer to the shore of lakes or the sea as riparian. The correct terminology is "littoral."
12. Rands, 389 U.S. at 122.
13. Id. at 123.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. (citing South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. (3 Otto) 4 (1876); Gibson v. United
States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897)).
17. Rands, 389 U.S. at 123 (citing United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S.
386 (1945)). This case is typical representing the denial of access cases. The landowner owned
property located on a navigable tide water creek near the Hampton Roads Naval Base. In
improving the naval seaplane base located there, the Navy deposited dredged material in the
creek, blocking any access from the creek to the bay. In denying compensation for the loss of
access, the Court again stressed that landowners along navigable waters have no property in-
terests in the water, and that any rights associated with the riparian location are subject to the
power of the government to regulate navigation.
18. Rands, 389 U.S. at 123-24.
19. "Fast lands" are located above the mean high-water mark. Although certain states
permit ownership to the mean low-water mark, private ownership of land along bodies of water
traditionally extends only to the mean high-water mark.
20. Rands, 389 U.S. at 123-24.
21. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865).
22. Gilman, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 713.
islature to construct a bridge over the Schuylkill River in 1853.11
The bridge was to be placed over a portion of the river further down-
stream and over water that was deeper than water under previously
constructed bridges.24 The city objected to the construction of the
bridge, because it feared that it would disrupt the flow of com-
merce."' Another bridge was authorized in 1857. It was this pro-
posed bridge which precipitated the Gilman case.26 A riparian land-
owner who owned coal wharves along the river objected to the bridge
construction, claiming that the bridge would constitute an illegal im-
pediment to his use of the river.2 The Court, however, rejected the
landowner's claim, holding that the state had properly exercised its
concurrent jurisdiction and had not interfered with federal power."
The Gilman decision is important for several reasons. First, the
court recognized that although federal power over navigation in tidal
waters is supreme, 2" this power is not exclusive. 0 Second, the court
concluded that the navigational servitude encompasses tidal waters.
3 1
The recognition by the court that the navigation servitude applies to
tidal waters is important because the vast majority of cases dealing
with physical takings as a result of the navigational servitude have
considered improvements made to nontidal waters. Last, the case is
significant because the Court traces the roots of the power from its
constitutional basis and its judicial roots.82 The Gilman Court recog-
nized that it was the federal navigational servitude that led Justice
Marshall to his resolution and recognition of the doctrine of federal
supremacy in Gibbons v. Ogden."
B. Physical Invasion Test
Following Gilman, the Supreme Court considered an increas-
ingly large number of claims for compensation for takings as a result
of governmental exercise of its supremacy over navigable waters. In
Pumpelly v. Green Bay and Mississippi Canal Co.,3 for example,
the Court articulated and explained the crucial "physical invasion"
test to be utilized to determine whether compensation is appropriate.
Although the actual flooding in Pumpelly resulted from a state navi-
23. Id. at 715.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 719.
27. Id. at 719-20.
28. Id. at 724-25.
29. Id. at 725-32.
30. Id. at 732.
31. Id. at 714. The Schuylkill River was tidal above the city at the time.
32. Id. at 726-29.
33. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
34. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 20 L.Ed. 557 (1871).
gation project which necessitated an interpretation of the Wisconsin
Constitution, the Court acknowledged that many states have prop-
erly held that consequential injury to a landowner's property arising
from public improvements is noncompensable.35 Nevertheless, the
Court cautioned that there were limits on how far such a principle of
non-compensation could be carried:
[W]e are of the opinion that the decisions referred to have gone
to the uttermost limit of sound judicial construction . . . . and
that it remains true that where real estate is actually invaded by
superinduced additions of water, earth, sand or other material,
or by having any artificial structure placed on it, so as to effec-
tually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking.3"
Although the Court set forth a principle that is appropriate in ripa-
rian land taking cases, courts have extended it to situations involving
littoral 7 takings which simply do not fit within its scope.
The "physical invasion" rule became firmly rooted in the Su-
preme Court's decisions concerning federal navigation projects be-
ginning in the late 1800s. In Gibson v. United States,38 the United
States Corps of Engineers had constructed a dike on the Ohio River
designed to divert water into a deeper navigation channel. 39 This di-
version caused Margaret Gibson, a landowner along the river, to lose
the use of a landing where she received and shipped farm supplies."0
Evidence indicated that the value of her farm was reduced from
$600 to $200 an acre.4 1 Ms. Gibson brought suit to recover her lost
value under the fifth amendment's "taking" clause.
In rejecting her claim, the Court reiterated the doctrine that all
navigable waters are under the control of the federal government
and that these waters are impressed with a dominant navigational
servitude.42 The Court stressed that the individual states, as well as
riparian landowners, are subject to this paramount claim.43 After re-
viewing a number of precedents which had denied recovery for land-
owners affected by navigation projects," the Court quoted Justice
Strong's now familiar "physical invasion" rule:
35. 20 L.Ed. at 561.
36. Id.
37. For a general definition of "littoral", see supra note 11.
38. 166 U.S. 269 (1897).
39. Id. at 270.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 270-71.
42. Id. at 272.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 272-73. The Court cited South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4 (1876);
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. i (1893); Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452 (1896).
[A]cts done in the proper exercise of governmental powers,
and not directly encroaching upon private property, though their
consequences may impair its use, are universally held not to be a
taking within the meaning of the constitutional provision. They
do not entitle the owner of such property to compensation from
the State or its agents, or give him any right of action."
The Court has unalterably maintained this stance. Three fairly
recent opinions have become the standard cases relied upon by the
government in litigation of this nature. In United States v. Willow
River Power Company,"" the Court denied compensation under the
fifth amendment to a hydroelectric power company located on an
artificial channel between a non-navigable and a navigable stream
where the navigational improvement raised the water level of the
navigable stream, thereby reducing the power head available to the
company. 7 The Court of Claims had granted compensation to the
company for the loss of the generating capacity."
In rejecting the company's claim, the Court held that while the
fifth amendment attempts to allocate certain losses inflicted by pub-
lic improvements, it does not "socialize" all such losses." Although
the Court recognized that owning land adjacent to waters might give
the landowner certain legal rights to enjoy some benefits from the
water, it rejected the idea that these rights were absolute against "all
the world."' 0 The Court refused to accept the argument that the
landowner owned any property right in the water power inherent in
the stream. 1 In conclusion, the Court stated:
Operations of the Government in aid of navigation ofttimes
inflict serious damage or inconvenience or interfere with advan-
45. Id. at 275.
46. 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
47. Id. at 501.
48. Id. at 499. The Court of Claims has utilized the physical invasion test in the littoral
erosion case which serves as a focus for this article. Interestingly, this court seems to cry out
for a more equitable approach, but feels bound by cases such as United States v. Willow
River. See Pitman v. United States, 457 F.2d 975, discussed infra notes 73-92 and accompany-
ing text.
49. Id. at 502.
50. Id.
51. Id. The Court stated:
It is clear, of course, that a head of water has value and that the Company
has an economic interest in keeping the St. Croix at the lower level. But not all
economic interests are "property rights;" only those economic advantages are
"rights" which have the low back of them, and only when they are so recognized
may courts compel others to forbear from interfering with them or to compen-
sate for their invasion. The law has long recognized that the right of ownership
in land may carry with it a legal right to enjoy some benefits from adjacent
waters. But that a closed catalogue of abstract and absolute "property rights" in
water hovers over a given piece of shore land, good against all the world, is not
in this day a permissible assumption.
tages formerly enjoyed by riparian owners, but damage alone
gives courts no power to require compensation where there is not
an actual taking of property. Such losses may be compensated
by legislative authority, not be force of the Constitution alone."
The Court likened such uncompensated damages to a riparian owner
to those suffered by a landowner living along a highway.53 Two years
after Willow River was decided, the Court handed down United
States v. Dickinson." This decision is especially significant because
it appears to limit recovery for erosion damages to instances in which
the erosion is caused by a physical invasion of the fast lands of an
owner after the water level has been elevated above the existing high
water mark.
Dickinson concerned a controversy surrounding the construction
of the Winfield Dam on the Kanawha River in West Virginia. The
United States Congress authorized the construction of the dam to
improve the navigation on the river.55 Because the level of the river
behind the dam was raised to create the pool behind the structure,
certain properties were permanently flooded." Congress compen-
sated landowners whose properties were permanently flooded"7. The
elevation of the water level also caused erosion.58 Both the district
court and court of appeals awarded compensation for this erosion
using a measure of compensation based on the cost to the landown-
ers for actions they might take to prevent further loss from erosion.59
In sustaining the award for erosion, the United States Supreme
Court seemed to premise the award for erosion from flooding of the
property upon the added requirement that the government must have
raised the water level above the high-water mark.60 The Court re-
jected the government's argument that compensation should not be
awarded for erosion. 1 The Court reasoned that the government must
pay for property which is flooded and which inevitably washes away
as a result of the flooding. 2
The requirement that there be an actual physical invasion re-
sulting from a rapid elevation of the water level above high water
52. Id. at 510 (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 510-11.
54. 331 U.S. 745 (1947). The water level was raised in a year in this instance. The
dam was completed in August 1937 and by September 1938 the normal pool level which af-
fected the plaintiff's land was reached. Id. at 746-47.
55. Id. at 746.




60. Id. at 750.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 750-51.
marks works well in streams and impoundment cases. The chances
that it would take only a year to flood a littoral property to the ex-
tent of the flooding that occurred in Dickinson, a freshwater case,
are remote. Such requirements are difficult, if not impossible, to sat-
isfy in a coastal setting. Few, if any, improvements along the coast
will ever cause a rapid elevation of the water. Instead, the' flooding
process will be slow.
The final case in the trilogy is United States v. Virginia Electric
& Power Co.' s Virginia Electric demonstrates the naked power and
breadth of the dominant navigational servitude. In 1944, Congress
authorized the construction of a dam and reservoir on the Roanoke
River in Virginia and North Carolina. 4 The government condemned
a flowage easement 5 of 1840 acres, which was part of a 7400 acre
estate.66 The Court, while rejecting the government's claim that a
flowage easement is not property compensable under the fifth
amendment, agreed that the value of the land should not be mea-
sured in the same manner that riparian property is measured in the
market place.67 Instead, the Court concluded that the district court's
decision to exclude any value resulting from the riparian location of
the property was correct. 6 This analysis, according to the Court,
was proper because the value of the land as a riparian property was
derived from its location on a stream subservient to the dominant
navigational servitude.69 The Court stated:
Thus, just as the navigational privilege permits the Government
to reduce the value of riparian lands by denying the riparian
access to the stream without compensation for his loss, . . . it
also permits the Government to disregard the value arising from
this same fact of riparian location in compensating the owner
when fast lands are appropriated. 0
C. Summary
These three cases and their predecessors have created formida-
ble obstacles to landowners trying to secure compensation for gov-
ernmentally created erosion along the sea coast. A synthesis of these
cases indicates that to obtain a recovery, a riparian or littoral owner
whose land has eroded from a navigational improvement project
63. 365 U.S. 624 (1961).
64. Id. at 624-25.
65. Id. at 625.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 631-32.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 632-36.
70. Id. at 629 (citing United States v. Commodore Park, 324 U.S. 386 (1945)).
must:
(1) show that there has been a physical invasion of the property
caused by governmental activity designed to improve navigation
which has raised the water level above the high water (tide) mark;
(2) show that any erosion caused by this increased water level is
attributable to the governmental activity; and
(3) demonstrate the loss of value attributable to the activity as
measured without relationship to the lands riparian or littoral
location.
This article focuses on the first condition as it has been applied
to seashore erosion cases. The second and third elements involve
complex problems of proof and valuation that create additional diffi-
culties for a littoral owner's successful compensation suit."'
III. Application of the Physical Invasion Test
A. The Pitman and Miramar Decisions
Few cases have been reported in federal or state courts dealing
directly with compensation for governmental, artificially created ero-
sion on the seashore. Perhaps the reason for this lack of case law is
that litigation concerning governmental activity affecting land values
in coastal areas has centered on destruction or impairment of ac-
cess.72 The best illustration of the interpretation of the "physical in-
vasion" rule as it applies to governmentally created artificial coastal
erosion is Pitman v. United States.7 3 Pitman concerned a claim by a
landowner to recover the value of four acres of beach front property
in Brevard County, Florida, which eroded as a result of the construc-
tion of the Canaveral Harbor Project. The project was designed to
provide a deep-water harbor on the east coast of Florida north of
Miami.74 Although the landowner's property was not actually on the
Atlantic Coast, its position in relation to the typical currents which
maintain beach equilibrium is unquestionably analogous.
Beaches along the coasts of the United States generally have
four basic sand-affecting components: beach material, waves, wind
71. Proof of erosion and its causes in littoral situations, while difficult, is not impossible
to establish. Many coastal states frequently aerially photograph their beaches. For example,
according to Texas Assistant Attorney General Ken Cross, the state's General Land Office
takes aerial photographs of the entire Texas coast after each hurricane, and periodically dur-
ing periods of hurricane activity.
By analyzing these photos taken over a period of years, a litigant has evidence of the
increase in the rate of erosion after the placement of a navigational improvement. Such an
analysis could also establish whether a previously accreting beach has begun to erode after
such construction.
72. Commodore Park, 324 U.S. at 386.
73. 457 F.2d 975 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
74. Id. at 975-76.
and tides.7  The onshore-offshore flow evidenced by the waves hitting
the beach normally causes the most significant amount of natural
alteration to the beach.7 " Longshore currents, which are currents
paralleling the beach front, help keep the beach in equilibrium by
depositing sand along the shore." Wind also plays an important part
in adding or removing sand.
78
The landowner in Pitman had property which was nourished by
a large southerly littoral drift. ' The property actually was accreting
prior to the construction of the harbor works.8 0 After work began,
property to the north of the construction continued to increase in size
through accretion caused by the drift.81 To the south, including the
claimant's property, the beach began to erode.8" The beach had
eroded so badly by 1964 that 300 feet of the plaintiff's beach had
been lost, 83 prompting the landowner to construct a sea wall and
groin."'
In rejecting the plaintiff's claim for compensation under the
fifth amendment, the Court of Claims mechanically applied the
physical invasion analysis to the property. The court took pains to
point out that the United States Corps of Engineers had never en-
tered the plaintiff's property, and that all the project construction
and maintenance were performed below the high-water mark of the
75. For an excellent discussion of the processes affecting a typical beach, see Bottar,
Coastal Processes and Change: Legal Implications, I SEA GRANT L.J. 139 (1976).
76. Id. at 141. Bottar explains the process in the following manner:
The fundamental force operating on the shoreline is that generated by the im-
pact of waves, a consequence of wind energy. Wave action can modify the shore-
line by suspending sediment and transferring it to the beach or by attacking the
beach and removing it to deeper water. Whether a wave will be constructive or
destructive depends on its steepness or the ratio of wave height (this distance
from crest to trough) to wave length (the distance from crest to crest). As the
ration increases, so does the wave's destructive capacity. High ratios normally
occur during the winter months when the shores are pounded by gales with the
lower ratios limited to milder summer weather.
77. Id. at 142. Bottar explains this process thereby:
Waves can also modify the shoreline by creating currents. This phenomenon oc-
curs when the direction of the wave approach is oblique to the shoreline and
longshore currents are generated. These currents are powerful enough to transfer
laterally sediment that has been suspended by wave action or deposited in the
area by rivers and streams. The direction of wave approach is relevant since it
will induce longshore currents in the same direction. These currents, in turn will
deposit some of their loan on the up current side of obstacles such as promonto-
ries or up current of the river plume produced when rivers empty into compara-
tively stationary bodies of water. On the down current side, beach material lost
to wave attack in the winter cannot be replaced because the obstacle impedes
deposition by the longshore current.
78. Id.
79. Pitman, 457 F.2d at 976.
80. Id.






The court reasoned that to recover, the landowner would have
to show a property right in the uninterrupted and natural flow of the
Atlantic Ocean."6 In analogizing the littoral problem with the Su-
preme Court's decisions dealing with changes to navigable streams,
the Court of Claims opined that since no riparian owner had prop-
erty rights in a stream's water power, a littoral owner could not
claim the same rights in a littoral flow.87
The landowner could not prove that the Corps of Engineers
raised the level of the Atlantic Ocean.88 The Court of Claims rea-
soned that this failure was critical to its resolution of the case.89 In
rejecting the litigant's claim, the court noted that in cases in which
recovery for governmentally created erosion was allowed, the af-
fected landowners had made a demonstrable showing that the water
level had been raised.90 Thus, the court concluded:
It is established in this case that no entry was made upon the
plaintiff's land by the Corps of Engineers in the course of the
construction or maintenance of the project. This, together with
other facts stated above, shows that the interruption of the
southerly littoral flow by the construction of the jetties at the
entrance harbor was not a direct invasion or appropriation of
plaintiff's property of the kind which entitles plaintiff to com-
pensation, and that the erosion of his land is a consequential
damage for which no recovery may be had.91





90. The landowner relied upon Coates v. United States, 93 F.Supp. 637, 117 Ct. Cf.
795 (1950) and United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917). The Court of Claims distin-
guished these cases on the basis that the landowner demonstrated that the Government raised
the water level above the ordinary high-water mark directly causing the destruction com-
plained of in each of the cited cases. Pitman, 457 F.2d at 977.
91. Pitman, 457 F.2d at 977 (citing Franklin v. United States, 101 F.2d 459 (6th Cir.),
affid, 308 U.S. 516 (1939); R.J. Widen Co. v. United States, 357 F.2d 988 (Ct. Cl. 1966)).
The Court relied upon two decisions, which it said were factually almost identical, Southern
Pacific Co. v. United States, 58 Ct. C1. 428 (1923), affd, 266 U.S. 586 (1924), and Tennessee
Gas Transmission Co. v. United States, 173 Ct. Cl. 1180 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 943
(1966). In Southern Pacific, the Court of Claims dealt with a claim by the Southern Pacific
Company for loss of property which was washed away from the company's railroad by a jetty
built by the United States War Department. The company's railroad ran along the shores of
Tellamoot Bay, Oregon. The jetty was constructed on the north entrance to the bay.
Prior to the construction of the breakwater, the Railroad owned a strip of land about 500
feet from its right of way and the high-water mark. The jetty was completed in 1917. By 1915,
only one year after construction began, the 500 foot strip owned by the company was com-
pletely washed away with part of the railroad's tracks.
The railroad sued the government for compensation under the fifth amendment. In re-
jecting the claim, the court stated:
Moreover it does not appear that there has been a taking of property in this
case for which compensation can be awarded. It is true that the loss of property
To its credit, the Court of Claims seemed genuinely distressed at the
result, stating:
There is no doubt that plaintiff has sustained damages and that
a substantial portion of the damages he claims are due to the
construction and maintenance of the Canaveral Harbor Project.
However, in order to permit recovery in this case, it would be
necessary for us to overrule the cited decisions of this court and
to ignore many controlling decisions of the Supreme Court.
Since we decline to do so, it follows that defendant's motion for
summary judgement is granted, plaintiffs motion for summary
judgement is denied, and the petition is dismissed. 9
In Miramar Co. v. City of Santa Barbara,8 the Supreme Court
of California applied the same analysis to littoral erosion caused by
state controlled navigation projects. The Miramar Company oper-
ated cottages and hotels on Miramar Bay.94 In 1927, the City of
Santa Barbara constructed a permanent breakwater three miles west
of the Miramar Company's property." The plaintiff alleged that the
breakwater stopped the natural littoral flow and washed away the
remaining sand,"6 and claimed $750,000 in damage.9
In rejecting the compensation claim brought under the Califor-
nia Constitution, which requires compensation for takings and dam-
ages to land, the California court relied on both state and federal
did not occur until the jetty had been built by the government; that the building
of the jetty caused the loss is a matter of opinion; but assuming that there was
some connection between the work of the government and the flow of the ocean
currents and the consequent loss or damage of the plaintiff's property, it does not
follow that the government is under obligation to pay therefor as for taking of
the property. . .. If the plaintiff can recover in this court for a taking under the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution it must be upon an implied contract.
58 Ct. Cl. at 432.
The Supreme Court, in affirming the decision relied upon its decision in Sanguinetti v.
United States, 264 U.S. 146 (1924), a freshwater physical invasion case.
Tennessee Gas Transmission was another freshwater invasion case in which the plaintiff
failed to allege that the government had raised the level of the high-water mark during the
construction and operation of the Greenup Lock and Dam below the dam. In an amended
complaint, the landowner alleged only that the velocity, not the height of the water, had been
altered. The Court of Claims ordered the complaint dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. The Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's writ of certiorari at
383 U.S. 943 (1966).
Although the Supreme Court has not decided a case similar to Pitman, Southern Pacific,
and Tennessee Gas Transmission these cases taken together can be interpreted as approving of
the Court of Claims' use of the traditional freshwater physical invasion test in littoral erosion
cases.
92. Pitman, 457 F.2d at 978.
93. 23 Cal.2d 170, 143 P.2d 1 (1943).
94. Id. at 171, 143 P.2d at 1.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 172, 143 P.2d at 1.
decisions." The court observed that the state which owns submerged
land"9 could rightfully construct navigational improvements even
where the natural flow of the bay is interrupted, so long as the state
is not pre-empted by the federal government. °10 According to the
court, the littoral owner obtained sand prior to the construction of
the breakwater only because of the proximity of the land to the
water. 10' Reasoning that other decisions have concluded that a state
could deny access to the bay without paying compensation, the court
held that the City of Santa Barbara should not be responsible - its
improvement merely disrupted the flow of a current in which the
landowner had no property right. °'
B. The Carter Dissent in Miramar
Justice Carter wrote a lengthy and blistering dissent in the Mir-
98. Id. at 180, 143 P.2d at 6.
99. Id. at 180-84, 143 P.2d at 6-7. In 1947 the United States Supreme Court ruled
that the United States has paramount rights to lands underlying the territorial sea of Califor-
nia. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947). In 1950, the Court made a similar hold-
ing regarding lands underlying the territorial waters of Louisiana and Texas in United States
v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950). These cases culminated a 20-year battle between the states
and federal government over rights in the resources underlying these lands.
In 1953, in reaction to the decision, Congress passed the Submerged Lands Act, 43
U.S.C. § 1301-1356, t'o re-establish state control over the lands. The legislation described the
boundary as follows:
The seaward boundary of each original coastal state is approved and con-
firmed as a line three geographical miles distant from its coast line or, in the
case of the Great Lakes, to the international boundary. Any state admitted sub-
sequent to the formation of the Union which has not already done so may extend
its seaward boundaries to a line three geographical miles distant from its coast
line, or to the international boundaries of the United States in the Great Lakes
or any other body of water traversed by such boundaries. Any claim heretofore
or here-after asserted either by constitutional provision, statute, or otherwise,
indicating the intent of a state so to extend its boundaries is approved and con-
firmed, without prejudice to its claim, if any it has, that its boundaries extend
beyond that line. Nothing in this section is to be construed as questioning or in
any manner prejudicing the existence of any State's seaward boundary beyond
three geographical miles if it was so provided by its constitution or laws prior to
or at the time such state became a member of the Union, or if it has been
heretofore approved by Congress.
43 U.S.C. § 1312.
Because the last sentence of the definition permitted an extension of the territorial sea
beyond three miles in certain instances, a new round of litigation ensued. In United States v.
Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960) the Court rejected claims of extended territorial seas for Louisi-
ana, Mississippi and Alabama. The Court permitted Texas' territorial sea to be extended to
three marine leagues (a bit over 10 miles), because of the location of the State's boundary
when Texas entered the Union. Texas was a Republic before its entrance. In United States v.
Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960), the Court granted Florida three marine leagues off the gulf
coast.
Since the entire controversy was over ownership of the oil and gas, the Submerged Lands
Act and the cases merely reestablished the status quo ante. The states still had concurrent
power to regulate navigation and make improvements. Their control over the beaches remained
the same.
100. Miramar, 23 Cal.2d at 173-74, 143 P.2d at 2.
101. Id. at 174-76, 143 P.2d at 3.
102. id.
amar case. 1'0 He argued that if the property had been washed away
because of the change in the current, it would constitute a taking.
His analysis is an articulate and correct dissection of what actually
occurs in cases such as this.
Justice Carter interpreted plaintiff's complaint as alleging that
the breakwater washed away the landowner's property and prevented
the natural replenishment of the land by changing the long shore
current."0 4 Justice Carter reasoned that such a situation was a taking
for which compensation must be paid, stating:
If the breakwater so changed the action of the water that after
its construction the sole effect was a washing away of the sand
with no compensating deposit, the condition created is not sub-
stantially different than a diversion of the currents with a result
that the upland was washed away. It is not a case of being de-
prived merely of future accretions where the abutting property
owner is depending upon the possibility that they might increase
the area of the land. Rather, it is simply the loss of his upland
which he already possesses by the change in the action of the
water. Hence, we have a case where a littoral owner's upland
property is being taken from him as the result of the mainte-
nance of the breakwater which changes the action of the water.
A public agency may not take a littoral owner's upland
property by flooding, erosion or otherwise in the exercise of its
control over navigation or in the exercise of any other power
without the payment of just compensation. ... 105
Justice Carter observed that Miramar's beach was being washed
away and inundated.' 0° He stated that "the point of mean high tide
is thus raised and the land that was formerly a privately owned
beach becomes tide lands and is owned by the state.'
' 07
Justice Carter's analysis recognizes the differences and similari-
ties between the rationales denying and granting compensation
where physical invasions occur in freshwater improvement cases.
First, he recognizes that it is close to impossible for any improve-
ment to raise the water level of a bay or ocean in a fashion identical
to freshwater diversion or impoundment cases. Second, he at least
implicitly recognizes that the time element is compressed in fresh-
water diversion or impoundment cases due to the dramatic and fast
rises of water levels in small bodies of water.'0 8 Finally, Justice
103. Id. at 180-93, 143 P.2d at 6-12.
104. Id. at 181-86, 143 P.2d at 6.
105. Id. at 181-182; 143 P.2d at 6-7.
106. Id. at 187; 143 P.2d at 9.
107. Id. at 187; 143 P.2d at 9.
108. Id. at 180-87, 143 P.2d at 6-9. While Justice Carter did not specifically articulate
the time differences, a close reading of the dissent indicates that the freshwater cases should be
Carter appears to recognize that it is not the landowner's claim to a
property right in the water that is crucial, but his expectation that
the government will not so alter the composition or location of that
water to cause a flooding of the property.109 It is this alteration that
causes the flooding of fast land which supports an award for compen-
sation. This alteration of the composition or location of water is ex-
actly the same phenomenon that occurs in the freshwater flooding
cases.
Both the majority opinion and the Carter dissent recognized
that, as a result of the breakwater, the high water mark on the prop-
erty retreated landward. 110 However, only Justice Carter correctly
analogized this gradual retreat to the "flooding" which occurs in the
freshwater cases. The United States Supreme Court's requirement
that there be a flood caused by the elevation of the water level is
unworkable as a practical matter. Further, it has been misunder-
stood in cases dealing with littoral erosion.
C. Summary
The courts do not seem to take into account that any erosion
caused by a navigational project along the coast will occur much
more slowly than in freshwater impoundment or diversion cases.
Likewise, courts misunderstand the nature of the interest that the
landowner is claiming in the waters adjacent to the land. The Court
of Claims and California Supreme Court have both failed to take
into account these factual differences between the fresh and littoral
cases. In addition, both courts failed to recognize the similarities pre-
sent when applying controlling Supreme Court decisions. These dif-
ferences and similarities are addressed following an analysis of the
current trend in the United States Supreme Court to expand the
read as authority for this position, thus rejecting that different factors are operating.
109. Id. at 188, 143 P.2d at 10. Justice Carter argued:
It is reasoned that because the public agency may in the interests of naviga-
tion deprive an owner of land on navigable waters of access thereto, it may erect
structures which prevent accretions. Assuming that to be true, there still is the
question of diverting the currents of the ocean in such a fashion as to wash away
plaintiff's land. The right to have his land free from the diversion of currents
with the results of the washing away of his land is not a part of his littoral rights
nor dependent thereon. All the cases cited in the opinion involve an interference
with the owner's littoral rights. Not one of them, except as hereinafter men-
tioned, involves the washing away or flooding of the upland land as a result of
the diversion or obstruction of the current of a navigable stream.
id.
Such a process may be only a damaging for which the California Constitution and not the
United States Constitution requires compensation. Since Justice Carter correctly analyzes the
process to a physical invasion, there has been a taking. The federal courts recognize that com-
pensation is required in the freshwater cases. See Pumpelly, 8 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 20 L.Ed.
557 (1871).
110. Miramar, 23 Cal.2d at 174-76, 186, 143 P.2d at 3, 9.
scope of takings compensable under the fifth amendment in inverse
condemnation cases.
IV. Inverse Condemnation and the Supreme Court: An Emerging
Trend
A. Background
In a typical taking case, the government initiates a condemna-
tion suit to acquire property to carry out governmental activities.
Under the United States Constitution, the government must pay
"just compensation" for property taken for a "public use".111 A huge
body of case law has developed interpreting the phrases, "public
use" and "just compensation.""'
A fairly "new" concept has emerged as a corollary to the in-
creasing complexity of federal, state and local governments and their
activities.113 Regulatory measures undertaken by governmental bod-
ies often severely affect the value of land. As interest in land use
control has increased, inverse condemnation suits have occurred
more frequently. Inverse condemnation cases are not suits brought
by the government to condemn land, but are actions filed by land-
owners seeking compensation from the government for regulatory or
other governmental actions which have unconstitutionally destroyed
the value of their property. Most of the cases applying the physical
invasion test are inverse condemnation suits seeking compensation
for damages or takings claimed to have resulted from navigational
improvements.
Courts in both the federal and state systems naturally have been
reluctant to hold governments liable for monetary damages resulting
from misuse of the police power. Under the typical scenario, a land-
owner brings suit challenging a land use decision, such as zoning, as
unconstitutional. The suit usually seeks interim damages for the pe-
riod of time the unlawful regulation is in effect." 4 Led by the Cali-
111. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
112. There are numerous major treatises on the subject. See, e.g., NICHOLS ON EMINENT
DOMAIN (1950).
113. All three levels of government have the power of eminent domain. Many special
purpose agencies such as school boards have been given the authority. The power of eminent
domain is an attribute of sovereignty that a nation possesses merely by its existence. 1 NICH-
OLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN 65 (1950). The United States Constitutional provisions dealing with
takings merely limit the power. They are not a grant of power. D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLAN-
NING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 311 (1975).
114. The California Supreme Court has been the most reluctant to award interim dam-
ages in inverse condemnation cases. The two major cases in which the California Court
awarded interim damages are Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) and San Diego
Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
F or an excellent discussion of regulatory takings see Cunningham, Inverse Condemnation
as a Remedy for "'Regulatory Takings", 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 517 (1981) [hereinafter
fornia Supreme Court, the trend is to deny compensation to land-
owners who are successful in their challenges, holding that
invalidation of the offending regulation is an adequate remedy.
B. The California Cases
The most extreme example and articulation of the invalidation/
no compensation rule is found in Agins v. City of Tiburon.'"  In
Agins, the plaintiffs argued that the city's planned unit development
and open space classification were unconstitutional. In the alterna-
tive, the plaintiff's claimed the city's action amounted to a taking
(inverse condemnation). 116 The California Supreme Court held that
a landowner who has alleged that substantially all use of his land has
been destroyed by governmental action "may not. . .sue in inverse
condemnation and thereby transmute an excessive use of the police
power into a lawful taking for which compensation in eminent do-
main must be paid. 1 11 The court reasoned that to allow compensa-
tion in such a case would result in a chilling effect on land use
planning.1 '
The United States Supreme Court affirmed.1 19 The Court, how-
ever, set forth the standard to apply to find if there has been a regu-
latory taking:
The determination that governmental action constitutes a taking
is, in essence, a determination that the public at large, rather
than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state
power in the public interest. Although no precise rule deter-
mines when property has been taken, .... the question necessa-
referred to as Cunningham].
115. 24 Cal.3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979).
116. Id. at 272, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 277, 598 P.2d at 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378. The Court stated:
We envisage that the availability of an inverse condemnation remedy in
these situations would pose yet another threat to legislative control over appro-
priate land-use determinations. It has been noted that "The weighing of costs
and benefits is essentially a legislative process. In enacting a zoning ordinance,
the legislative body assesses the desirability of a program on the assumption that
compensation will not be required to achieve the objectives of that ordinance.
Determining that a particular land-use control requires compensation is an ap-
propriate function of the judiciary, whose function includes protection of individ-
uals against excesses of government. But it seems a usurpation of legislative
power for a court to force compensation. Invalidation, rather than forced com-
pensation, would seem to be the more expedient means of remedying legislative
excesses."
Id. (citing Fulham & Scharf, Inverse Condemnation: Its Availability in Challenging the Va-
lidity of a Zoning Ordinance 26 STAN.L.REV. 1439, 1450-51 (1974); and Bowden, Legal Bat-
tles on the California Coast: A Review of the Rules 2 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 273
(1974)).
119. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). The Court agreed that the land use
regulation was not unconstitutional.
rily requires a weighing of public and private interests. .... 120
Because the landowner in Agins could still build on the property,
albeit in a lower density than before the zoning change, the Court
failed to find a denial of "justice and fairness" required by the fifth
and fourteenth amendments. 1
Following its decision in Agins, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari in another California regulatory taking
case. In San Diego Gas and Electric Company v. City of San Di-
ego, 2 " the California Supreme Court, having just decided Agins, re-
manded the case to the court of appeal, which had granted compen-
sation, for a decision in conformity with the Agins holding.'2 3
Factually, the San Diego case had arisen from a change in San Di-
ego's zoning scheme reducing the amount of land available for indus-
trial use."2 4 The San Diego Gas and Electric Company purchased
land available for siting a nuclear power plant. 2 5 The particular
land owned by the utility was included in an open space designation
and there were plans for the City of San Diego to eventually acquire
the land for a park. 2 6 The utility sought damages in inverse con-
demnation and a declaration that the zoning change was unconstitu-
tional. 127 On remand, the court of appeals reversed itself, and the
California Supreme Court denied further review. The utility
appealed.
A majority on the United States Supreme Court held that the
judgment appealed from was not a final order under 28 U.S.C. §
1257, which authorizes review by the Supreme Court of final state
court judgments. 2 8 The Supreme Court observed that although the
court of appeals denied compensation, it did not decide whether or
not a taking had occurred. Justice Rehnquist reluctantly joined the
majority, but expressed support for the four justice dissent, which
reached the merits after finding the judgment to be final.'29
Justice Brennan wrote the dissent. He began his analysis by re-
minding the other members of the Court that although all impacts
on property values resulting from the exercise of police power regu-
lations are not compensable, the Court has long cautioned that such
120. Id. at 260-61.
121. Id. at 262-63.
122. 450 U.S. 621 (1981). This case has become one of the most important land use
cases decided in the last decade.
123. Id. at 628-29.
124. Id. at 624-25.
125. Id. at 624.
126. Id. at 625.
127. Id. at 626.
128. Id. at 633.
129. Id. at 633-36.
regulatory measures could be "so onerous as to constitute a taking
which constitutionally requires compensation."' 30 Brennan cited
United States v. Dickinson to support his thesis that the Court has
traditionally found takings outside of the context of formal eminent
domain proceedings. 31 He also relied on Pumpelly v. Greenbay
Co.,1 32 quoting the decision for the proposition that the Court has
long recognized:
[lt would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in con-
struing [the Just Compensation Clause]. . .it shall be held that
if the government refrains from the absolute conversion of real
property to the uses of the public it can destroy its value en-
tirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent injury to any ex-
tent, can in effect subject it to total destruction without making
any compensation because, in the narrowest sense of that word,
130. Id. at 648 (quoting Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)). Professor
Cunningham in his article on regulatory takings, agrees with Justice Brennan's conclusion, but
disagrees with his argument that the Court had dictated such a result from prior regulatory
takings cases:
Although this writer in general approves the conclusions reached by Justice
Brennan in the San Diego case, this writer does not share Justice Brennan's
stated belief that these conclusions are dictated by prior decisions of the Su-
preme Court. None of the Supreme Court cases relied upon by Justice Brennan
held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires that compensation be awarded to
a landowner whenever the court finds that a regulatory taking has occurred; nor
does any of these cases suggest that any remedy other than invalidation is consti-
tutionally required, whether the regulatory taking is permanent or only tempo-
rary. Since none of the cases relied upon involved an attempt by the landowner
to invalidate the land use regulations applicable to his land, any judicial state-
ments about compensation could only be dicta, in any event. On the whole, this
writer is inclined to agree with those who assert that the word "taking" was used
metaphorically in these cases to describe an invalid exercise of the police power-
invalid because the land use regulations in question were too restrictive. Conse-
quently, this writer would prefer to see Justice Brennan's conclusions in San
Diego justified on the basis of the policy considerations that support his interpre-
tation of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to regulatory taking cases, not
on the theory that the proper interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as
applied to such cases is perfectly clear - so clear as to dictate the conclusions
reached by Justice Brennan. In fact, of course, even the application of the Fifth
Amendment to formal eminent domain proceedings is often far from clear; for
example, it was far from clear that the term "public use" in the taking clause of
the Fifth Amendment really meant "public purpose," as the Supreme Court held
in Berman v. Parker.
Cunningham, supra note 113, at 538-39.
It seems to this author that Professor Cunningham's criticism of Justice Brennan is too harsh.
Justice Brennan's reliance on precedent is not totally misplaced. In fact, many of the Court's
prior decisions if taken to their logical extreme would support Brennan's conclusion. Conceded
by, the physical invasion cases which Brennan cites in the opinion concern takings which are
outside of the traditional land use area. But they are nonetheless takings resulting from regula-
tory measures.
In addition, one merely has to read Brennan's critique of Agins in the San Diego Gas &
Elec. and Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) to recognize
the Court's movement toward a policy more favorable to landowners in takings cases. This
conclusion is further strengthened by examining the Court's decision in Kaiser Aetna.
131. San Diego Gas & Elec., 450 U.S. at 660. See also supra note 54.
132. Id. at 651. See also supra note 34.
it was not taken for the public use.'
Justice Brennan also quoted United States v. Willow River Power
Co.3'4 for the proposition that just compensation seeks to redistribute
economic loss from an individual to the public when that individual
is asked to assume more than a fair share of the public burden.
135
Brennan severely criticized the California Supreme Court's holding
in Agins that no compensation is required in such regulatory taking
cases. 136
133. Id.
134. Id. at 656. See also supra note 46.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 656-57. Brennan stated:
Moreover, mere invalidation would fall far short of fulfilling the fundamen-
tal purpose of the Just Compensation Clause. That guarantee was designed to
bar the government from forcing some individuals to bear burdens which, in all
fairness, should be borne by the public as a whole. Armstrong v. United States,
364 U.S. 40, 49, L. Ed. 2d 1554, 80 S. Ct. 1563 (1960). See Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. at 260, 65 L. Ed. 2d 106, 100 S. Ct. 2138; Andrus v. Allard,
444 U.S. at 65, 62 L. Ed. 2d 210, 100 S. Ct. 318. When one person is asked to
assume more than a fair share of the public burden, the payment of just com-
pensation operates to redistribute that economic cost from the individual to the
public at large. See United States v. Willow River Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502, 89 L.
Ed. 1101, 65 S. Ct. 761 (1945); Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States,
148 U.S. 312, 325, 37 L. Ed. 463, 13 S. Ct. 622 (1893). Because police power
regulations must be substantially related to the advancement of the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare, see Village of Euclid v. Ambler Re-
alty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395, 71 L. Ed. 303, 47 S. Ct. 114, 4 Ohio L. Abs. 816,
54 ALR 1016 (1926), it is axiomatic that the public receives a benefit while the
offending regulation is in effect. If the regulation denies the private property
owner the use and enjoyment of his land and is found to effect a "taking," it is
only fair that the public bear the cost of benefits received during the interim
period between application of the regulation and the government entity's rescis-
sion of it. The payment of just compensation serves to place the landowner in the
same position monetarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been
taken. Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S.
470, 473-474, 35 L.Ed.2d 1, 93 S. Ct. 791 (1973); United States v. Reynolds,
397 U.S. 14, 16, 25 L.Ed.2d 12, 90 S. Ct. 803 (1970).
The fact that a regulatory "taking" may be temporary, by virtue of the
government's power to rescind or amend the regulation, does not make it any
less of a constitutional "taking." Nothing in the Just Compensation Clause sug-
gests that "takings" must be permanent and irrevocable. Nor does the tempo-
rary reversible quality of a regulatory "taking" render compensation for the time
of the "taking" any less obligatory. This Court more than once recognized that
temporary reversible "takings" should be analyzed according to the same consti-
tutional framework applied to permanent irreversible "takings." For example, in
United States v. Causby, supra, at 258-259, 90 L.Ed. 1206, 66 S. Ct. 1062, the
United States had executed a lease to use an airport for a one-year term "ending
June 30, 1942, with a provision for renewals until June 30, 1967, or six months
after the end of the national emergency, whichever (was) the earlier." The
Court held that the frequent low-level flights of Army and Navy airplanes over
respondents' chicken farm, located near the airport, effected a "taking" of an
easement on respondents' property. 328 U.S. at 266-267, 90 L.Ed. 1206, 66 S.
Ct. 1062. However, because the flights could be discontinued by the Government
at any time, the Court remanded the case to the Court of Claims: "Since on this
record it is not clear whether the easement taken is a permanent or a temporary
one, it would be premature for us to consider whether the amount of the award
made by the Court of Claims was proper."
The Court's extensive reliance on the physical invasion cases to
support the proposition that compensation should be paid in inverse
condemnation suits is significant because the Court has been moving
towards an expansion of the rights deemed compensable under the
takings clause. Another significant case signaling a more liberal ap-
proach to the fifth amendment regulatory taking cases is Penn Cen-
tral Transportation Co. v. City of New York.
137
C. The Penn Central Decision
The Penn Central decision concerned a comprehensive plan to
preserve historic landmarks and historic districts in New York City.
As part of this comprehensive plan, the City of New York imposed
overlay preservation districts, which required prior approval of
changes in historic structures. 13 8 The city ordinance was designed to
balance the public's interest in preserving the city's historic buildings
with the property owner's right to receive a "reasonable return" on
his or her investment.13 9
Penn Central Transportation Company owned Grand Central
Station.140 To increase its revenues, the company entered into a
renewable fifty-year lease with a development company. 41 The
agreement would have permitted the development company to con-
struct a multistory office building above the terminal in return for $1
million annually during construction and $3 million annually after
completion."" Penn Central Company and its lessee applied to the
Preservation Commission for approval of the changes and new con-
struction, but their plans were rejected. 4 3 Consequently, Penn Cen-
tral sued the city. When the case reached the Supreme Court, two
issues were presented: whether the restriction was a taking; and if so,
whether transferable development rights constitute just compensa-
tion. 44 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, found no taking;
therefore, the second issue was not reached.1 45 The dissent, however,
suggested a new approach to inverse condemnation cases.
The Court first upheld the Historic Preservation ordinance gen-
erally, maintaining that such regulation could be justified on the
Id. at 656-57 (emphasis in original).
137. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
138. Id. at 107.
139. Id. at 107-09.
140. Id. at 116-17.
141. Id. at 116.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 122.
145. Id. Although the Court did not reach the issue of whether transferable rights per-
mitted by the ordinance would be just compensation, it argued that such rights ensured that
there was no denial of all use of Penn Central's air rights.
ground that historic preservation was a proper subject for the exer-
cise of the police power.' 46 The Court also recognized that some
landowners would naturally be affected to a greater degree than
others. 14 7 Notwithstanding these threshold determinations, the Court
analyzed whether the Penn Central Company was being asked to
give up so much that the preservation ordinance effected a taking, as
applied to Penn Central. 148
The Court found that there had been no taking because the or-
dinance did not interfere with any present uses of the station. On
this basis the Court distinguished the physical invasion cases.1" 9 The
Court also argued that transferral rights, in the form of development
rights in the air space above the property, were still available and, if
sold, would help mitigate any injury. 150
In the dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger, and Justices
Rehnquist and Stevens recognized that although traditional zoning
ordinance may reduce property values, the burden is normally
shared by a large percentage of the public, and it is reasonable to
assume that the burdened landowner would benefit from other as-
pects of the zoning.' To the dissenting justices, Penn Central was
being asked to suffer a multi-million dollar loss even though the
preservation zoning applied to less than "one-tenth of one percent"
of New York's structures. 52 To these justices, this was exactly the
evil the fifth amendment was designed to prevent:
[The Fifth Amendment prevents] the public from loading upon
one individual more than his just share of the burdens of govern-
ment, and says that when he surrenders to the public something
more and different from that which is exacted from other mem-
bers of the public, a full and just equivalent shall be returned to
him.
53
In both the San Diego Gas & Electric and Penn Central cases,
the Supreme Court analyzed traditional land use planning tech-
niques. In addition, the most important analytical statements were
found in the dissents. It would appear, however, that the present
Court is becoming more and more receptive to examining the sub-
stance, not the form, of governmental activity to determine whether
146. Id. at 129.
147. Id. at 124-25.
148. Id. at 135-36.
149. Id. at 136-37. The Court's holding that the Railroad could still use the air space by
erecting a smaller building or through sale distinguishes it from the physical invasion cases.
150. Id. at 137-38.
151. Id. at 139-42.
152. Id. at 147.
153. Id. at 147-48 (quoting Monongahela Nvaigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S.
312, 325 (1893)).
a landowner is being asked to bear a disproportional burden.'"
D. The Kaiser Aetna Decision
The final case in which this Court has examined inverse con-
demnation involved the parameters of the navigational servitude.
The opinion in Kaiser Aetna v. United States1 55 has created some
controversy over its proper interpretation. The underlying dispute
concerned a claim by Kaiser Aetna for compensation for public ac-
cess to a Hawaiian marina created by Kaiser Aetna out of a previ-
ously nonnavigable body of water owned by Kaiser Aetna." 6 Kaiser
Aetna consulted with and was granted approval by the Corps of En-
gineers to connect a pond to the Pacific by a channel. 57 Kaiser
Aetna dredged out the pond to create the marina and then dredged
the channel. 158 A dispute then arose between the Corps and Kaiser
Aetna when Kaiser Aetna sought to deny public access to the navi-
gable waters in the channel and marina.'5 9 The Corps contended
that Kaiser Aetna could not deny public access because the naviga-
tion servitude covered all navigable waters. 60
In rejecting the Corps' argument, the Court, through Justice
Rehnquist, stated:
It is true that Kuapa Pond may fit within the definition of
navigable articulated in past decisions of this Court. But it must
be recognized that the concept of navigability in these decisions
were used for purposes other than to delimit the boundaries of
the navigational servitude. . . . [T]his Court has never held
that the navigational servitude creates a blanket exception to the
Takings Clause whenever Congress exercises its Commerce
Clause authority to promote navigation.' 6 '
The Court reviewed its holdings in the physical invasion and access
cases, maintaining that the earlier cases and the Kaiser Aetna case
might be separated by a fine line.
The Court conceded that prior decisions, which limited the gov-
ernment's liability in riparian access cases, if carried to their logical
154. At least six members of the Court have indicated a willingness to closely scrutinize
governmental regulatory taking cases. Justices Burger, Rehnquist and Stevens demonstrated
such a willingness in Penn Central. And Justices Brennan, Marshall and Powell urged a simi-
lar analysis in San Diego Gas & Electric.
155. 444 U.S. 164 (1979). See also Ruhtenberg, Navigational Servitude - Taking of
Property Under the Fifth Amendment, 13 IND. L. REv. 819 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Ruhtenberg].
156. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 168-69.
157. Id. at 168-69.
158. Id. at 167.
159. Id. at 168.
160. Id. at 170.
161. Id. at 171-72.
extreme, could be applied to claims for just compensation in other
types of cases. 62 However, the Court held fast to its long-held posi-
tion that when the government acquires fast lands under the rubric
of the navigational servitude, it must pay fair value for the prop-
erty.163 The Court held that if the Corps proceeded with its demand
for public access, compensation would be required.' 6"
One commentator correctly suggests that Kaiser Aetna may be
read merely as a case determined on peculiar ancient Hawaiian
law.' 6 5 Nevertheless, the same writer also postulates that the Court's
decision could be interpreted in such a manner "that [the] federal
navigation servitude is secondary to state-recognized property inter-
est."' 6  This interpretation represents a significant change in "judi-
cial recognition of ownership rights in navigable waters, affecting
those owners who have title to lands adjacent to. . .bodies of
water."'
61 7
Kaiser Aetna properly stands for the latter position. The dis-
senters in San Diego Gas & Electric rely upon Kaiser Aetna for the
proposition that the Court has repeatedly found compensable takings
outside of the traditional eminent domain proceedings.' 68 If Kaiser
162. Id. at 177.
163. Id. at 177-78.
164. Id. at 180.
165. Ruhtenberg, supra note 154, at 819, 831.
166. Id.
167. Id. Professor Frank Michelman of Harvard University echos the sentiment that
Kaiser Aetna stands for a much broader application of the fifth amendment than previously
thought. See Michelman, Property As A Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1097
(1981), in which Professor Michelman states:
The decision marks a sharp break with the expansive treatment of the navi-
gation servitude concept in a long series of prior cases. Those cases had seem-
ingly established that anyone who invests in the prospect of future private ex-
ploitation of proximity of one's land to navigable water does so at the risk of
uncompensated impairment resulting from exercises of the navigation powers of
the United States. It was taken as a given in the Supreme Court's decision that
Kaiser Aetna's lagoon had become a navigable water once the channel was
dredged. Moreover, the government's act of requiring public access to this navi-
gable water fell squarely within the ambit of its established navigation powers.
In sum, the standing law external to the fifth amendment itself did not pur-
port to entitle Kaiser Aetna to compensation for damage wrought by exercises of
the navigation power respecting the converted lagoon. The property right vindi-
cated in the Kaiser Aetna decision must, then, have been a direct constitutional
right, not a derivative one. The circumstances of the case-the initial acquiescence
of the Corps in the dredging proposal, the fact that the utility of the lagoon for
sea-going navigation had just been created by the imagination and investment of
Kaiser Aetna, and the perception that making a nominal owner of property open
his land against his will to strangers is a supreme insult to the notion of private
ownership-all apparently conspired to make the Court decide that, regardless of
whether the standing law warranted any secure expectation on Kaiser Aetna's
part of legal respect for its exclusive right, Kaiser Aetna was constitutionally
entitled to just such an expectation. The property right vindicated by the Court
in the Kaiser Aetna case was thus, contrary to Justice Stewart's assurance in the
Roth case, one that was "created by the Constitution."
Id. at 1107.
168. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 450 U.S. at 652.
was merely limited to the peculiarities of Hawaiian law, it would be
indeed be strange to have cited~ft for such a general application.
Particularly when coupled with the emerging liberalization by
the Court in the traditional land use cases, Kaiser Aetna should have
applicability to littoral owners like those in Miramar and Pitman.
The following analysis of future claims for compensation for artifi-
cially created erosion takes into account the trend articulated in the
Penn Central, San Diego Gas & Electric and Kaiser Aetna holdings,
and the appropriate interpretation of the physical invasion test in
seashore inverse condemnation cases.
V. The Fifth Amendment Restored
The physical invasion test works fairly well for bodies of fresh-
water such as streams, reservoirs or other impoundments. Because
these water bodies typically contain small, contained beds, it is not
difficult for the Corps of Engineers or other governmental agencies
to alter flows or water levels substantially and dramatically. The
Court, in cases such as Dickinson, Willow River and Rands, resolved
claims for compensation when the flooding process occurred or would
occur in a relatively short time. Because the intrusion was dramatic
and tangible, the Court could not deny compensation and remain
consistent with logical analysis.
Although the Court apparently has not considered the situation
involving gradual, governmentally created erosion along the coast in
a case with facts similar to those in Pitman and Miramar, it would
initially appear that the Court would mechanically apply the physi-
cal invasion test. Such an approach would be inappropriate. Even
ignoring Kaiser Aetna and the liberal trend in regulatory taking
cases, the physical invasion test itself, if properly applied and ana-
lyzed, would support a decision resulting in compensation under the
facts of Pitman and Miramar.
To require an elevation of the water level along the coast identi-
cal to the required elevation in river and impoundment cases ignores
that recovery would be denied to 99 percent or more of the littoral
owners lying along bays and inlets, or along the Atlantic, Pacific and
Gulf Coasts. It is difficult to imagine any navigational improvement
project along a coast that would so raise the water level in such a
relatively short period of time. Such a mechanical application of the
physical invasion doctrine ignores the similarity to the actual physi-
cal processes involved in the freshwater cases.
Although concededly the Court uniformly has held that a ripa-
rian landowner has no property right in the water adjacent to his
property, the Court has implicitly recognized that the landowner has
a right to expect that the government will not alter the composition
or location of that water causing flooding. This is the underlying ba-
sis for the analysis in the Willow River and its progeny.
A blockage of a littoral current bringing sand parallel to a coast
is analogous to the change of the direction of a stream or river which
so alters the course of the water causing an invasion. It can hardly
be argued that had a river breakwater been constructed in such a
manner that it diverts the flow crosstream, the subsequent flooding
of the landowner's property would not require compensation. This
result flows not from any claim of ownership in the stream, but from
an artificial alteration of the physical flow of the water. Again, if
flooding is to take place in the river diversion hypothetical, it will do
so rapidly.
Along the coast, however, an analogous scenario occurs less rap-
idly. Because the beach is sand starved, the on-shore/offshore cur-
rents will gradually deplete or erode the beach front. Actually, the
landowners closer to the structure probably will experience an in-
creased energy impact in some cases because of the diversion of the
on-shore/offshore currents along the sides of the structure, resulting
in a more rapid and more severe sand loss. The beach gradually will
retreat in any event. The original high and low water marks will
move inland, allowing the water to flood or inundate the previous low
and high water marks. Unfortunately, this transition on the beach
will be gradual, not at all analogous to the natural changes that do
not deprive the landowner of title.169 As evidenced by the Pitman
and Miramar scenarios, this loss of sand over time can be
devastating.
Parts of the foregoing analysis apparently were proposed by Jus-
tice Carter in Miramar but were rejected by the courts. A re-evalua-
tion of his arguments alone should be enough to change the outcome
in similar cases in the future. Moreover, when coupled with the re-
cent developments in the United States Supreme Court in regulatory
taking cases and the interpretation of navigational servitude, Justice
Carter's analysis is virtually pre-ordained.
Throughout its consideration of the physical invasion cases, the
Court has reiterated that the fifth amendment "expresses a principle
of fairness, and not a technical rule of procedure enshrining old or
new niceties regarding 'causes of action.' "170 This doctrine of fair-
ness has been translated by the present Court into a rational test
which examines the extent to which a landowner is being asked to
169. In Pitman, 457 F.2d at 975-76, the loss of sand was rapid, but still took about ten
years. By 1964, ten years after the construction was completed, some 300 feet, or three feet a
year had been lost. In Miramar, 23 Cal.2d at 171-72, 143 P.2d at 1-2, some seven years
passed between the construction completion and the suit.
170. Dickinson, 331 U.S. at 748.
shoulder an unfair cost when the government is carrying out a public
regulatory function.
At least six of the members of the present Court have evidenced
a willingness to re-examine the legal niceties surrounding the takings
cases. 1 To permit the permanent and substantial destruction of val-
uable property along the coast through blind application of the phys-
ical invasion test to cases of gradual erosion would be entirely incon-
sistent with earlier analysis applied by the present members of the
Court.
An additional factor which may influence such decisions is the
increasing recognition of the importance of beaches to the coastal
environment. Beaches serve as the best natural protector of uplands.
Barrier islands often separate estuaries from the ocean. These estua-
ries serve as nursery grounds for such fish stocks as shrimp, redfish
and weakfish. Beaches also serve a vitally important recreational
need.
Regulatory takings, as evidenced by the increasing number of
inverse condemnation suits, are far more insidious and frequent than
direct takings through the traditional eminent domain proceeding.
Such cases place the burden to prove a taking on the landowner. The
landowner challenging a regulatory action confronts a variety of pre-
sumptions, such as the presumption that governmental agencies act
constitutionally. Because of the costs of litigation and the real possi-
bility of failure, landowners often forego such challenges. The
Court's recent message that it will employ a cost/benefit analysis in
place of the formerly employed mechanical approaches may en-
courage a renewal of interest in littoral erosion lawsuits.
Last, the Court's apparent retreat from holdings that the regu-
latory power to improve navigation is co-extensive with the naviga-
tional servitude, may signal a re-examination of the extent to which
the government's control over navigation makes riparian and littoral
land subject to these activities without compensation. If Kaiser
Aetna actually signals a recognition of greater property rights in the
water adjacent to such property, the physical invasion test as applied
to littoral landowners will undergo renewed critical analysis.
VI. Conclusion
At present, federal and state case law indicates that governmen-
tally created artificial erosion along the coast is not compensable
under the fifth amendment or state constitutional takings provisions.
171. These include Chief Justice Burger (dissent in Penn Central); Justice Rehnquist
(dissent in Penn Central and concurring opinion in San Diego); Justice Stevens (dissent in
Penn Central); Justice Brennan (dissent in San Diego); Justice Marshall (dissent in San Di-
ego); Justice Powell (dissent in San Diego).
The traditional physical invasion test consistently has been applied to
takings in freshwater streams and impoundment cases when the ri-
parian landowner's property has been flooded following an elevation
of the water level above the high water mark. The test has been
mechanically applied in the coastal area with little critical analysis.
The doctrine arguably is sensible when the time element be-
tween the completion of the navigation improvement and flooding is
relatively short. However, in the coastal area, where the water level
itself cannot be raised per se and the changes occur over long periods
of time, the test loses its rational underpinnings. The Court may
soon overrule its current analysis in Pitman/Miramar situations. Ac-
cordingly, littoral owners finally will cease carrying a disproportion-
ate burden when the government constructs public improvements.
An uncritical reliance on the "niceties" of the physical invasion test,
instead of our coastal beaches, therefore should be eroded.

